

 TCM 75-26

C 1 of 1
TCM 75-26

Trends in Communist Media

2 Jul 75

~~Confidential~~

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

~~Confidential~~

2 JULY 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 26)

This report is based exclusively on foreign media materials and is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified by: C00073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.



CONFIDENTIAL

FRIS TRENDS
2 JULY 1975

CONTENTS

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

- U.S. Senators Hear Gusev Urge New SALT Accord. 1
Moscow Assesses 1976 Elections, Sees Major Issues at Stake. . 2

MIDDLE EAST

- Primakov Says U.S., USSR Approaches Cannot Be Counterposed. . 4

INDIA

- PRC Critical, USSR Supportive of Gandhi Moves To Hold Power . 7

KOREA

- Pyongyang Stresses Peaceful Intentions on War Anniversary . . 10

PRC-THAILAND

- Diplomatic Ties Established During Prime Minister's Visit . . 13

USSR-THAILAND

- Moscow Backs Independent Thai Policy But Warns of PRC Threat. 15

INDOCHINA

- Cambodia Denies News of Thai Border Clashes, Mass Starvation. 18
South Vietnam Media Claim Capture of Seaborne "Infiltrators". 19

CEMA

- Council Session in Budapest Focuses on Integration, Energy. . 21

PORTUGAL

- USSR Critical of Socialists, Cautious on Transition Program . 24

NOTES

- Moscow on "Instructions" to Western CP's;
Chinese CP Anniversary 27

APPENDIX

- Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics i

Classified by 000072
Automatically declassified
on 09-26-2001

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

2 JULY 1975

- 1 -

U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

U.S. SENATORS HEAR SUSLOV URGE NEW SALT ACCORD

A U.S. Senate delegation visiting Moscow heard CPSU Politburo member Mikhail Suslov on 30 June reaffirm Moscow's interest in reaching a new SALT accord based on the Vladivostok understanding of last November, as they were engaged in a frank discussion of outstanding issues in U.S.-Soviet relations by their Soviet hosts. On 2 July the delegation, headed by Senators Humphrey and Scott, met with Brezhnev for what TASS called a "frank and businesslike" discussion of unspecified bilateral and international issues. TASS said in addition that they agreed on the need for a further improvement of relations "on the basis of equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual benefit." During the 29 June to 2 July stay, the delegation also met with Boris Ponomarev,* alternate Politburo member and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Soviet of Nationalities, and other members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, including USA Institute head Georgiy Arbatov.

Suslov met the senators on the 30th in his capacity as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In his remarks he emphasized Moscow's commitment to a continuing, long-term effort to limit strategic arms, despite his obvious concern over the state of detente in the United States. He said Moscow sets "great store" by the Vladivostok understanding. He reiterated Moscow's belief that arms limitation and other measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war occupy the "central place" in U.S.-Soviet relations. Looking to the future, Suslov stressed the continuing nature of SALT and took "special note" of the understanding by the sides that follow-on negotiations for a new agreement would begin "long before the expiration" of the agreement currently being negotiated, that is 1985. Suslov's remarks on SALT follow on the heels of similar expressions of interest in a new SALT agreement by Brezhnev and Podgorny during the election campaign for republic supreme soviets in early June.

* Ponomarev headed a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation which visited Washington in May 1974. Moscow made it known at the time that it hoped that visit would be only the first in a regular series of exchanges between the legislatures of the two countries. The Soviet parliamentarians' visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 30 May 1974, pp. 4-5.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
2 JULY 1975

- 2 -

Following the recent example of other Soviet leaders, Suslov expressed concern over the status of detente in Washington as U.S. policy is adjusted to the requirements of a new post-Indochina environment. He complained not only about the "stepped-up activities" of detente's opponents but also about the continuing scope of the U.S. arms program. He asserted that for its part the USSR continued to believe, as Brezhnev first stated in October 1973, that in the long run detente can be consolidated only if accompanied by arms reduction.

Touching on other areas, Suslov complained about the delay in U.S. ratification of the Threshold Test Ban treaty signed last summer and concluded that both economic and political relations have been seriously damaged by "actions of the U.S. Congress" on the trade bill last fall. He reassured the senators that Moscow continues to believe that U.S.-Soviet detente "can and must be further deepened."

MOSCOW ASSESSES 1976 ELECTIONS, SEES MAJOR ISSUES AT STAKE

Recent Moscow comment assessing the prospects for the 1976 U.S. presidential elections has underscored two themes: that the coming election will center on major issues of foreign as well as domestic policy, and that President Ford's continuity in office is by no means insured. Traditionally, Soviet analyses of U.S. politics have made light of the notion that elections provide U.S. voters with meaningful policy choices. These initial commentaries on the presidential campaign seem to reflect Moscow's hope that improved U.S.-Soviet relations not become linked too closely in the public mind with the incumbent President or any other single individual.

A regular weekly Moscow radio roundtable discussion of foreign affairs on 29 June concluded that "unlike normal practice" the 1976 election campaign "will be centered not on secondary matters, interparty or personal struggles, but on cardinal problems of domestic and foreign policy which will impart great political significance to this campaign." Despite the suggestion that foreign policy will be at issue the broadcast seemed to minimize the likelihood that the winner of the election, whatever his party, would be opposed to improved U.S.-Soviet relations. Regular TV-radio commentator Valentin Zorin noted that all the potential challengers to President Ford, save Governor Wallace and Senator Jackson, were supporters of detente and that the sympathies of the voters inclined in that direction as well. Zorin implied that President Ford would be most vulnerable on economic issues. He noted predictions by

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
2 JULY 1975

- 3 -

U.S. economists that unemployment will remain at a high level into 1976 and concluded that "this factor will turn against the party in power."

A long article on U.S. domestic politics in an early June issue of ZA RUBEZHOM placed more emphasis on the political "instability" caused by the impasse between Congress and the President than on economic difficulties. But it drew implications similar to Zorin's for the elections, quoting several U.S. observers who felt the country would have a new President in 1977.

Such commentary in the Soviet media suggests that Moscow is concerned to avoid identification of improved U.S. relations with any single individual, despite its continued stress on the importance of personal diplomacy. Since the closing months of the Watergate affair, Moscow has sought to underscore publicly its belief that U.S.-Soviet detente is based on "objective," long-term factors rather than individuals. Earlier, in the wake of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet summit, the fortunes of detente became closely linked in Moscow with President Nixon. Moscow's initial sympathies were only thinly disguised, as the former President's Watergate critics were vaguely linked with anti-detente forces. As the import of Watergate sank in, however, Moscow adopted a more neutral position and began publicly to stress that the vast majority of those who disagreed with the former President domestically supported his policy toward the Soviet Union.

FORD BIOGRAPHY Soviet readers were presented with a generally favorable biographical sketch of President Ford in the May 1975 issue of USA. A review of Jerald F. terHorst's recent biography noted Ford's alleged reservations in the 1960s about the U.S. role in Indochina and his "very reserved position" with respect to the investigations of Senator Joseph McCarthy. The review did note, however, that during his Congressional career "Ford's thrifty attitude toward the government budget did not extend to military expenditures."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

2 JULY 1975

- 4 -

MIDDLE EAST

PRIMAKOV SAYS U.S., USSR APPROACHES CANNOT BE COUNTERPOSED

While some Moscow commentators are continuing to express the usual criticism of American-backed "partial steps" toward a Mideast settlement, Yevgeniy Primakov, a leading Soviet Middle East expert, on 29 June took a new tack in insisting that this approach, and the Moscow-favored overall settlement, should not be counterposed. While Moscow has from time to time conceded that partial steps were useful "if" they led to an overall settlement, Primakov's view that the two choices are not mutually exclusive is particularly notable, coming at a time when the United States is trying to secure a second Israeli-Egyptian accord.

Speaking on the weekly Moscow radio observers' roundtable, Primakov set the stage by remarking that Secretary Kissinger's mediating mission in March had been unsuccessful, and that President Ford had recently met with the Egyptian president, the Israeli prime minister, and the Syrian foreign minister. Without mentioning the current Israeli-Egyptian diplomatic exchanges through the United States, Primakov maintained that the "Western" idea of only two possible ways to settle the conflict--the U.S.-backed step-by-step approach or the Soviet-supported "solution in one go"--was "totally incorrect." He insisted that these two choices "just cannot be set off against each other" and later reiterated, for emphasis, that "these two elements must not be opposed to each other." If the goal is a full settlement, then this "surely can be done in a step-by-step manner," Primakov argued, recalling that the Soviet plan proposed in 1969-1970 outlined a phased withdrawal of Israeli troops.* By his reference in this context to the Soviet proposals--seldom mentioned in Moscow media since 1972--Primakov may have been suggesting that Soviet and U.S. views on a final settlement could conceivably be reconciled in a common approach.

* Details of the Soviet proposals were outlined in major PRAVDA articles in January 1969 and January 1970; see the TRENDS of 29 January 1969, pages 10-13, and 28 January 1970, pages 16-19. Primakov has been one of the few major Soviet commentators to discuss the proposals in some detail, in a 15 October 1970 PRAVDA article, on the Moscow radio observers roundtable program of 19 December 1971, and in a PRAVDA article of 5 January 1972.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

2 JULY 1975

- 5 -

Primakov added the customary caveat, however, that both sides had to want to achieve a final settlement, and only then could the step-by-step approach be combined with a comprehensive settlement; otherwise, partial accords would result in freezing the situation. Asked if he thought a new armed conflict might flare up in a few months or the "foreseeable future," Primakov said he did not exclude this possibility if there was no political settlement.

GUARANTEE, BORDERS Primakov voiced common Soviet complaints about Israeli policies, noting in particular that Israel rejected any big-power guarantees and pointedly recalling that Gromyko had "emphasized" Soviet readiness to give guarantees to all states in the area, including Israel, when he met with Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam in Moscow this past April. Criticizing Tel Aviv for insisting on secure borders, rather than accepting guarantees, Primakov claimed that advancing borders by 10 or 15 miles was "rubbish" from the security aspect "in view of the new means of waging war," and that such borders would yield no security because they would "not be recognized by anyone." And he accused Israel of a diplomatic turnabout in calling for direct talks with the Arabs but now refusing to talk with the Palestinians.

GENEVA TALKS In line with Moscow's markedly diminished attention to the Geneva Mideast peace conference, Primakov did not mention the possibility of reconvening the talks, although there continue to be muted references to Geneva as the proper forum for an overall settlement. For example, IZVESTIYA's Kudryavtsev concluded a 26 June article with such an observation. And TASS on 30 June, reporting a meeting of USSR Supreme Soviet deputies with a visiting U.S. Senate delegation, cited Suslov as remarking on "the importance of resuming, given due preparation," the Geneva conference to discuss the entire complex of Mideast problems. Suslov went on to suggest that "coordinated USSR-U.S. actions in the right direction" could insure an early settlement of the Mideast conflict.

BACKGROUND ON "PARTIAL STEPS" The only other major Soviet commentator known to have offered a favorable view of the step-by-step approach was IZVESTIYA senior political observer A. Bovin, in a 10 October 1974 article pegged to Secretary Kissinger's 9-15 October Mideast trip. Much less forthcoming than Primakov has been now, Bovin remarked that "half-measures" such as the disengagement agreements could "serve as a useful means to shift the situation from a standstill and to facilitate radical advances." He noted, however, that such

CONFIDENTIAL

2 JULY 1975

- 6 -

accords could either "play a role" in politics or be used to "freeze" a situation.

Comment on the January and May 1974 disengagement accords had frequently assessed them as positive "first steps," always provided that they were followed by a comprehensive settlement. Brezhnev in a 30 January 1974 speech in Havana, for example, described the just-concluded Egyptian-Israeli accord as a positive step but warned against substitution of "only a partial measure" for an overall settlement.

Brezhnev addressed the subject in two later speeches, both at times when Secretary Kissinger was holding talks in the Middle East. In an 11 October 1974 speech in Kishinev, Brezhnev called the disengagement accords "useful as an initial measure," but again stressed that they had not solved "the main question--a complete settlement." And in a 14 February 1975 speech in Moscow Brezhnev tempered sharp criticism of "partial measures" with an acknowledgment that they could be "useful" as steps toward a "real peace settlement." Additionally, joint communiqués issued at the conclusion of separate visits to Moscow in April this year by Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy and Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam carried the formulation that "any partial measures and corresponding decisions on them must be a component, inseparable part of a general settlement," within the framework of the Geneva conference.

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
on 09/26/1999

- 7 -

I N D I A

PRC CRITICAL, USSR SUPPORTIVE OF GANDHI MOVES TO HOLD POWER

Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's latest moves to maintain power in India--decreeing a state of emergency, instituting censorship and making mass arrests--have drawn harsh criticism from Peking media. Soviet media, on the other hand, have predictably supported the prime minister's actions as justifiable to defend her government's policies and have accused Peking of interfering in Indian affairs.

PEKING COMMENT Peking has responded sharply to the Gandhi government's moves, offering its harshest personal rebuke of Prime Minister Gandhi in recent years and pointedly castigating Moscow's continued public support for the Indian leader. Initially Peking reacted discreetly to Mrs. Gandhi's 12 June conviction on corruption charges, with two low-key NCNA reports of 13 and 15 June citing news reports from New Delhi on Indian reaction to the ruling. However, following the 26 June state of emergency declaration, the Gandhi government's moves were roundly criticized in NCNA articles of 27 and 28 June and in a PEOPLE'S DAILY article on the 29th signed by Jen Ku-ping, an authoritative byline which appeared in the early sixties, disappeared during the cultural revolution and has appeared frequently this past year.

In contrast to Peking's usually circumspect references to Prime Minister Gandhi over the past several years, current comment has been replete with harsh personal invective, accusing her of using emergency powers to establish "an atmosphere of terror" and of employing "fascist suppressive measures." NCNA on the 27th said she had thrown off the "mask of 'democracy' and 'law'" and had made "a bitter mockery of bourgeois democracy." Jen Ku-ping charged in PEOPLE'S DAILY that the recent developments showed "the sanctimonious Indira Gandhi government did not hesitate to discard the last shred of the figleaf of 'democracy' and nakedly laid bare its ferocious features."

NCNA on the 27th depicted the Gandhi government's actions as a reflection of an "intensified scramble for power" between the prime minister and her opportunistic bourgeois political opponents. In contrast, the PEOPLE'S DAILY article on the 29th portrayed the growing popular outcry against Mrs. Gandhi as a long overdue and justified blow by the Indian masses against a leader who, it said, practices "dictatorial rule" at home and engages in Soviet-aligned policies abroad. Commentator Jen Ku-ping charged that over the past decade Gandhi had defended the interest of the landlords

CONFIDENTIAL
2 JULY 1975

- 8 -

and big bourgeoisie, suppressed revolutionary movements, and persecuted the working class, acting dictatorially as though "Indira is India and India is Indira." Under her rule, "the Indian economy is a mess, production is stagnating, commodity prices are skyrocketing, grain shortage is acute and famine is stalking the land," the article added. On foreign affairs it charged that the Gandhi regime "has thrown itself into the lap of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism," allowing Moscow to colonize India's economy while New Delhi, under Soviet protection, engages in aggression and expansion in South Asia to become the "junior hegemonic power" in the area.

Both PEOPLE'S DAILY and NCNA devoted special attention to pointing up Soviet backing for Gandhi, ridiculing recent PRAVDA and TASS articles defending her and charging that Moscow wanted to prop up Gandhi so as to continue its control of India and contend with the "other superpower" in South Asia. NCNA on the 27th also rebuked the pro-Soviet Indian Communist Party, referred to as the "Dange clique" by NCNA, for allegedly supporting the Gandhi regime's policies.

MOSCOW TREATMENT Moscow media continue to reflect staunch Soviet support for Prime Minister Gandhi in the wake of her moves against opposition political leaders. A 27 June article by PRAVDA correspondent Shchedrov, the most authoritative Soviet comment to date, typically justified Gandhi's actions with the explanation that Indian "rightists" and "reactionaries" were on the verge of toppling the government through demonstrations and protests and that there was a "real threat" to progressive government policies.

Soviet media have attempted to minimize the gravity of the situation in India, stressing that the emergency decree has not disrupted normal life and citing official Indian reports noting that only one-third of the persons arrested were political figures and that the rest had been apprehended for violations of criminal statutes. Moscow comment, including the Shchedrov article, claims that the measures adopted by Mrs. Gandhi have met with widespread public approval. •

Soviet comment has responded to Chinese criticism of Gandhi by condemning Peking for "grossly interfering" in Indian affairs. A 30 June unattributed Moscow domestic service commentary charged the Chinese leadership with "misinterpreting" the meaning of the emergency decree and supporting the "most shameless forces of Indian reaction," thereby unmistakably revealing themselves as "enemies"

- 9 -

of India. Radio commentator Sergeyev, in a 30 June broadcast in English to South Asia, dismissed the "attacks and slander by Peking's propaganda" as weak in comparison with the "large wave" of support for the Indian government by the "broadest democratic circles."

- 10 -

K O R E A

PYONGYANG STRESSES PEACEFUL INTENTIONS ON WAR ANNIVERSARY

Pyongyang greeted the 25th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June by emphasizing that North Korea has no aggressive intentions toward the South. For the first time in several years neither the DPRK defense minister nor the KPA chief of staff attended the Pyongyang rally. The main rally speech was given by Yu Chang-sik, formerly the North's deputy co-chairman and chief spokesman at the North-South Coordination Committee.

In standard fashion, Yu emphasized DPRK proposals for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem and scored U.S. and South Korean actions which he said created the danger of "war breaking out at any moment." Yu noted that the world situation "is now turning decisively in favor of our revolution" and called on the nation to fulfill the "paramount task" of forcing a U.S. withdrawal from the South and reuniting the country. Yu labeled "ridiculous" the charge that the North was preparing to invade, noting that "grand socialist construction is underway in full scale and the entire people and army are giving a helping hand to the peasants in their farm work," a theme taken from a 31 May Kim Il-song interview with AFP that had also been carried by Pyongyang media.

The KCNA report on the Pyongyang rally noted the attendance of a representative from the Revolutionary Party for Reunification-- ostensibly a Marxist-Leninist party based in the South. This is the first time since Pyongyang's 1970 announcement of the party's formation that KCNA has noted the presence of an RPR representative at such a function. There has been no other mention of the RPR in DPRK propaganda on the anniversary.

MEDIA TREATMENT Pyongyang media treatment of the anniversary generally followed normal patterns, with a NODONG SINMUN editorial, an "appeal" to the South Korean people, and reportage on the mass rally in the capital. There was no government memorandum on U.S. "crimes" in Korea as had been issued for previous quinquennial anniversaries in 1965 and 1970.

The NODONG SINMUN anniversary editorial emphasized the North's peaceful intent, noting that it was "not just once or twice" that the North has declared that it has "no intention of using force of arms to reunify the country." The "appeal" to the South similarly stated that the DPRK has "already declared more than once that it has no intention to invade the South."

- 11 -

YU ON "AGGRESSION" In his rally speech, however, Yu cautioned the United States to "make no mistake about our patient efforts to preserve peace in Korea," warning that the North was "always prepared to answer the enemy's war of aggression with a revolutionary war." He noted that in any future war, "we will lose only the military demarcation line but gain the reunification of the country," a theme that has become standard in Pyongyang propaganda since Kim Il-song used it in Peking in April. He urged the people to "watch every move of the enemy very closely and resolutely and immediately smash the slightest aggressive maneuver or provocation against us."

Yu stressed that the danger of aggression in Korea comes from the South, not the North. He alluded to recent U.S. statements of support for South Korea in claiming that U.S. officials had stated that the United States would "fight on the forefront should a war break out in Korea," would make "a deep thrust into the northern half of the republic," and would "even use nuclear weapons without hesitation." He claimed that the United States was "suffering dire political, economic and military crisis," but did not suggest that this affected the U.S. commitment to the ROK.

COMMENT ON PAK, JAPAN ISSUES Yu suggested that the world believes the Pak regime "is the next to fall after Indochina," but he himself did not call for President Pak's overthrow nor offer Northern support for the "struggle" in the South, unlike last year's rally speaker Yi Yong-mu, who had called on the North to "actively assist" the "bloody struggle" in the South. This year's "appeal" called for the southern people to "overthrow the traitorous military fascist dictatorial regime and establish a democratic coalition government represented by democratic forces of all segments"--a theme introduced earlier this year--but offered no explicit support for accomplishing this. KCNA reported on 27 June that at a meeting on the 25th a North Korean trade union official made the unusually strong--but not unprecedented--promise that the "working class" of the North would "discharge their class duty" if the United States started a war or if a "revolution breaks out in South Korea and our assistance is asked for." In a 22 April speech, DPRK Vice Premier Chong Chun-ki had said the North was "fully prepared for mobilization at any moment in the event the people's struggle surges still higher, the revolutionary situation ripens, and our support is called for," a theme echoed in a NODONG SINMUN May Day editorial.

Unlike 1974, when the North's anniversary comment had been harshly critical of Japan's alleged expansionist designs and graphically portrayed a Japanese threat to Korea, Pyongyang's criticism of

2 JULY 1975

- 12 -

Japan this year was muted. The NODONG SINMUN editorial contained no direct criticism of the Japanese. In his rally speech Yu accused Japan of perpetuating Korea's division for economic reasons and of "egging on" the Pak regime to provoke a war, but used relatively mild language. He also called on the Japanese to "give up their hostile policy toward our republic."

As in 1974, Pyongyang propaganda on the anniversary did not mention any outside assistance to the North during the Korean War.

PEKING, MOSCOW Peking commemorated the quinquennial 25th anniversary with a joint PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial on 25 June, a higher level than the normal PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. The joint editorial accused the Pak government, "under the backing and instigation of the U.S. imperialists," of aggravating tension in Korea and sabotaging the North-South dialog. The editorial demanded that the UN Forces Command in South Korea "be dissolved and the U.S. troops completely withdrawn from South Korea."

Moscow's treatment of the anniversary was subdued, as it has been in recent years, with no special attention devoted to the occasion in honor of the quinquennial. Moscow's usual caution in referring to the U.S. role in Korea was exemplified in a 25 June IZVESTIYA article which referred only to the presence of "foreign troops" in Korea. The article did cite a recent DPRK foreign ministry spokesman's charge that the United States had moved nuclear weapons into the South and constructed new military bases there, but did not directly suggest that these actions represented a threat to the DPRK. A 25 June RED STAR article suggested the U.S. military presence in the South "enabled" the Pak government to carry out repressive domestic policies and thus block Korea's reunification on a "peaceful, democratic basis." A 28 June Moscow radio commentary to Korea pointed up Moscow's continuing support for North Korea. It noted Soviet backing for the DPRK in the United Nations and other international organizations and "in the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and specific countries."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
2 JULY 1975

- 13 -

P R C - T H A I L A N D

DIPLOMATIC TIES ESTABLISHED DURING PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT

Peking has warmly welcomed the Thai delegation which arrived on 30 June, led by Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot who signed on the next day a communique establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. Peking's treatment of the development has closely paralleled that accorded two other ASEAN leaders' visits during which relations with the PRC were established--the visits of Malaysian Prime Minister Razak in May 1974 and Philippine President Marcos early this June. The Thai prime minister was met on his arrival and hosted by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping; on the 30th, he was received "in the hospital" by Premier Chou En-lai,* who also signed the 1 July communique, and he had a "friendly" talk with Mao Tse-tung on the 1st.

Echoing comment on President Marcos's visit last month, Peking laid special stress on alleged Soviet expansionist intentions in South-east Asia in the wake of communist victories over U.S.-supported regimes in Cambodia and Vietnam. Thus, while the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 30th reiterated Peking's usual line that rivalry between the two superpowers is the cause of instability in Southeast Asia, Teng Hsiao-ping's banquet speech the same day focused exclusively on the USSR as the present danger in the area: speaking in the usual euphemisms, Teng said that while one of the "superpowers" has suffered defeat and had to withdraw from Indochina,

the other superpower with wild ambitions has extended its tentacles far and wide. It insatiably seeks new military bases in Southeast Asia and sends its naval vessels to ply the Indian and West Pacific oceans, posing a menacing threat to the peace and security of the Southeast Asian countries. The spectre of its expansionism now haunts Southeast Asia, as it hankers for converting this region into its sphere of influence some day.

* Similarly, a 28 June NCNA report on Chou's visit with visiting Gabonese President Bongo stated, as usual, that the meeting took place in a Peking hospital. In reporting Chou's meeting with an American professor on 26 June, however, NCNA for the first time in over a year failed to specify that the meeting took place "in the hospital." Peking radiophotos and a picture in PEOPLE'S DAILY showed them meeting outdoors in front of a building.

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue

CONFIDENTIAL

- 14 -

In somewhat more forceful language than he had used during the Marcos visit, Teng went on to express confidence in the Southeast Asians' ability to resist superpower schemes, and he capped his assessment by saying: "Southeast Asia belongs to the people of the Southeast Asian countries, and not to any superpower."

The communique contained the now-standard anti-hegemony clause, underlining both sides' resolve to resist "any attempt by any country" to dominate or create spheres of influence in the world. The PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 30th referred in positive terms to Southeast Asian efforts to create a "zone of peace and neutrality" but as usual stopped short of direct endorsement of the concept.

On the delicate issue of Chinese support for insurgent movements, Peking followed virtually the same pattern as with Razak and Marcos. In his banquet speech on the 30th Teng balanced a pledge of continued Chinese support for "all oppressed nations and peoples in their just struggles" with a commitment to normalize state relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and he voiced opposition to interference in other countries' internal affairs. As in the Chinese communiques with Malaysia and the Philippines, the PRC-Thai communique pledged both parties to oppose foreign attempts at "aggression," "subversion," and "control." And as in the Sino-Philippines communique, the PRC-Thai statement reinforced the pledge to adhere to the five principles of coexistence by stating both sides' resolve to settle disputes without resorting to force and to respect each other's territorial integrity.

On the same day that the establishment of relations with the PRC was announced, the Thais issued a statement noting the termination of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The joint communique, following the recognition formula used in the Sino-Malaysian communique, said that Thailand "acknowledges" the PRC's position that Taiwan is an integral part of China. The communique during the Marcos visit, on the other hand, said that the Philippines "understand and respect" the PRC's position on Taiwan. Peking's handling of the Overseas Chinese issue in the communique also followed the pattern of the Sino-Malaysian communique, with Peking stating that it would not recognize dual nationality but would protect the "proper rights and interests" of Overseas Chinese who have not taken up Thai citizenship.

- 15 -

U S S R - T H A I L A N D

MOSCOW BACKS INDEPENDENT THAI POLICY BUT WARNS OF PRC THREAT

Moscow media have reflected a mixed Soviet response to Thai Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot's policy of a more independent stance vis-a-vis the United States while seeking formal relations with Peking, Hanoi, and the PRG. Soviet comment since the Khukrit government took office in March has welcomed Bangkok's demands for the removal of U.S. military forces from Thailand and Thai efforts to seek rapprochement with the Vietnamese communist regimes. At the same time the media display Soviet anxiety that Bangkok may come increasingly under Peking's influence, and comment has cautioned that establishment of relations with the PRC would not guarantee Thailand's security against Chinese interference in its internal affairs.

In line with Moscow's support for new Thai policies, Soviet media have portrayed the present Thai leadership in positive terms as "realistic-thinking." By contrast, Soviet comment had sharply criticized the military regime of Thanom Kittikachorn prior to its overthrow in October 1973, in particular decrying its cooperation with the United States in the Vietnam war and denouncing its leaders as "accomplices" in U.S. "aggression." Moscow media were generally noncommittal about the successor caretaker civilian government under Sanya Thammasak, which served from October 1973 through January 1975. While reporting approvingly moves under Sanya to reduce the U.S. military presence in Thailand, Soviet comment credited the policy to the pressure of the Thai "people's" struggle.

WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES

Soviet comment on the 26 January Thai general elections and the subsequent formation of the new government cited Bangkok newspapers and opinion polls to emphasize that the issue of U.S. military forces in Thailand was central to the election campaign. Explaining the failure of the first post-election effort to form a government, Moscow noted that the interim prime minister Seni Pramot had proposed an unacceptably lengthy 18-month timetable for removal of the forces. The one-year deadline for the U.S. withdrawal announced by Prime Minister Khukrit on 19 March was positively assessed by IZVESTIYA political observer Vikentiy Matveyev in the 23 March Moscow radio international roundtable program, and he noted that the announcement had importance that went "beyond the bounds of American-Thai relations." Matveyev charged that Peking desired the U.S. forces to remain in Thailand, citing such a view allegedly expressed by

- 16 -

Chou En-lai to the Thai deputy foreign minister on 8 January, and other Moscow comment has consistently pressed the charge that Peking opposes a U.S. pullout.

Moscow comment in mid-May appeared to view the Thai outcry against U.S. use of Thai bases in operations to recover the U.S. freighter "Mayaguez" as evidence of the sincerity of Bangkok's commitment to the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces. A 19 May Kalachev commentary over Moscow's domestic service, commenting on Khukrit's policy requiring the withdrawal of all U.S. forces by March 1976, asserted that "no matter how hard one may try to find a different approach, this is a very timely way of dealing with the problem."

THAI RELATIONS WITH DRV, PRG Moves since the end of the Vietnam War toward establishing formal ties between Bangkok and the regimes in North and South Vietnam have prompted approving comment from Moscow that often included the charge that Peking opposes such a rapprochement. Thus, during and after the May visits to Bangkok by PRG and DRV delegations,* Soviet media charged that Peking was attempting to torpedo the diplomatic efforts and accused the Chinese of colluding with the CIA to instigate and finance anti-Vietnamese rioting which broke out in Thailand's northeastern province of Nong Khai at the time of the Vietnamese delegations' visits. A typical Soviet commentary, broadcast in Thai on 28 May, maintained that Peking considered friendly relations between the Southeast Asian nations to be "a serious obstacle to its policy of world hegemony."

THAI RELATIONS WITH CHINA While there is not yet available substantial Soviet media reaction to Thai Prime Minister Khukrit's visit to China to establish relations with the PRC, Moscow media in recent weeks have repeatedly cautioned Bangkok that normalizing relations with the Chinese would not prevent continued PRC interference in Thai affairs and support for Thai insurgents. This point was stressed in a 1 July Moscow radio commentary, broadcast in English to South and Southeast Asia, which observed that Bangkok hoped Khukrit's mission would resolve problems with Peking, but that China had failed to honor its earlier assurances to Malaysia and the Philippines to cease interference in their countries after the establishment of relations in May 1974 and June 1975, respectively.

* The Thai-DRV talks, held in Bangkok on 21-29 May, are discussed in the TRENDS of 11 June 1975, pages 11-12.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
2 JULY 1975

- 17 -

Moscow has also warned that Peking would use the establishment of relations to interfere in the Thai economy. A 23 June dispatch from Bangkok by PRAVDA's correspondent Shchedrov specifically alleged that Peking would attempt to carry out such a scheme through its influence with the large Chinese population in Thailand, noting many of them have "influential economic positions." Shchedrov also attempted to offset the impact of Bangkok's rapprochement with Peking by maintaining that Thailand has a "growing" interest in the Soviet Union and quoting an interview with the Thai prime minister advocating further consolidation of political, economic, and cultural ties with the USSR.

CONFIDENTIAL

2 JULY 1975

- 18 -

INDOCHINA

CAMBODIA DENIES NEWS OF THAI BORDER CLASHES, MASS STARVATION

Western press reports alleging Thai-Cambodian border clashes, Cambodian mistreatment of foreigners, and widespread starvation in Cambodia have prompted the first substantial Phnom Penh comment on foreign affairs since mid-May.* A spate of comment by Phnom Penh radio, including a 29 June radio editorial and a 28 June "NUFC radio statement," has charged the United States with inciting "slanderous" reports in order to foster disputes between Cambodia and its neighbors. Consistent with Phnom Penh radio's usual silence on the question of Cambodia's relations with Vietnam, there has been no acknowledgment of U.S. media reports of clashes along the Cambodian border with South Vietnam.

The 29 June radio editorial charged that the United States had "incited some high-ranking Thai officials" to claim that Cambodian forces violated the Thai border on several recent occasions, and alleged that this was part of U.S. "evil and poisonous tricks" designed to deflect current anti-American feeling in Thailand toward the new Cambodian regime. The editorial underlined Cambodia's desire to "live in peace" with Thailand, reaffirmed the intent of the "Cambodian people" to have "friendly relations" with the "Thai nation and people," and noted that "the Thai people also have this good intention." It went on to castigate what it saw as a revived U.S. scheme to incite Asians to fight Asians, but predicted that the United States would meet with defeat, just as it did in the Indochina wars, because the "people" of Cambodia and Thailand "have closed their ranks" following the fall of the Lon Nol government. Phnom Penh radio's 29 June "weekly international news feature" voiced similar sentiments and called on its Southeast Asian neighbors to be "highly vigilant" against U.S. "inciting tricks" and "slanderous propaganda."

* The Phnom Penh radio last referred to Cambodia's relations with Thailand when it carried a 19 May Information and Propaganda Ministry statement denying reports of a Cambodian ultimatum to Bangkok on the border question. Earlier Phnom Penh efforts to rebut Western press reports of Cambodian-Thai border friction and of alleged Phnom Penh repression of foreigners were discussed in the TRENDS of 14 May 1975, pages 6-8.

- 19 -

The 28 June NUFC radio statement accused the United States of being behind an Australian radio report on the previous day that an Australian citizen, his Cambodian wife, and two French citizens were recently killed by the Khmer Rouge. The statement flatly denied the "false report" and formally appealed to foreign audiences to beware of the slanders of "the U.S. imperialists and their stooges."

Western reports of rampant starvation in Cambodia were denounced in a 22 June Phnom Penh radio commentary, which refuted allegations by "U.S. imperialists' slanderous propaganda" that large segments of the Cambodian population faced starvation under the new government's radical policies. The radio maintained that "despite some shortcomings" the regime has "fundamentally solved the question of our people's livelihood." The issue was also raised in a 30 June radio commentary which drew a dire picture of suffering and starvation under the previous Lon Nol government, with its dependence on U.S. assistance, and claimed that the self-reliant policies of the new regime had restored Cambodia's "good name and honor."

SOUTH VIETNAM MEDIA CLAIM CAPTURE OF SEABORNE "INFILTRATORS"

South Vietnamese media have claimed that "enemy infiltrators" have been apprehended attempting to "penetrate" South Vietnam from the sea and have reported that border security was being strengthened. The security actions are portrayed as attempts to prevent illegal entry and sabotage; there is no suggestion in the reports that there have been efforts to escape the country.

According to an LPA English report transmitted on 26 June, security soldiers in the Mekong Delta province of Bac Lieu on the 15th captured "a group of enemy infiltrators (among them two field-grade officers) aboard a foreign trawler sailing toward the mainland." The report goes on to claim that another seaborne group had been captured "earlier" in the same area, with "a large quantity of weapons, materials, documents, plus 6 million dong."

A 17 June Saigon radio broadcast--noting remarks made at ceremonies marking the end of a "reform study" session in a Saigon ward--warned that it would be "illusionary" to contemplate the revolution ever being sabotaged and that those who do so are "clutching at straws," since "henceforth no imperialist would dare venture on our soil."

CONFIDENTIAL
2 JULY 1975

- 20 -

A 1 July broadcast by the PRG's Liberation Radio noted that "armed security detachments" in the northernmost Thua Thien-Hue region have been transformed into "detachments in charge of defending the borders and inland targets." The brief report observed that these units would be responsible for security in coastal areas as well as elsewhere.

2 JULY 1975

- 21 -

C E M A

COUNCIL SESSION IN BUDAPEST FOCUSES ON INTEGRATION, ENERGY

The communique issued at the close of the 29th CEMA session, held 24-26 June in Budapest at the premier level, announced the adoption of a five-year multilateral economic integration plan for joint projects during the 1976-80 period. The document, issued after the first top-level CEMA meeting since Moscow raised the price of oil sold to its East European partners last January, also portrayed the sensitive energy supply problem as a joint responsibility of all CEMA members and disclosed plans to set up a "unified power supply system."

Like the communique issued after the 28th CEMA session in Sofia in June 1974, this year's document reported "complete identity of views." However, there are hints in the media that Romanian Premier Manescu was not fully in accord with the decisions. Unlike last year's session, there was no report this year of any Manescu speech in Budapest. Bucharest media coverage of the session was limited to brief reports of Manescu's activities, including "friendly" bilateral meetings with Kosygin and other East European premiers, and to publication of the communique text in SCINTEIA on the 27th.

The possibility that Romanian objections were raised at the Budapest session could account for Kosygin's defensive justification of the new five-year integration plan in his speech at the 26 June closing session which seemed to contrast with his glowing portrayal of the plan's benefits at the opening session two days earlier. As reported by TASS on the 27th, Kosygin declared at the windup session that the multilateral integration plan could not be construed as enabling "some" countries to build their well-being at the expense of the others. He went on to insist that "multilateral plans are in no respect in conflict with the plans for national economic development in each individual" CEMA member state. In what seemed a further admonition to the Romanians, Kosygin noted that successes so far in multilateral economic cooperation were due to the CEMA member countries' "wise Marxist-Leninist policy," their cohesion and unity of action, and their "profound trust" in each other. Echoing Kosygin, a Levin commentary carried by Moscow radio on the 27th stressed that there was no contradiction between the individual member countries' economic plans and the integration plan, which was said to serve both the socialist community and "the flourishing and consolidation of each component country."

- 22 -

Romanian sensitivity on the issue of integration was underscored in May and June by the appearance of a spate of articles in the daily SCINTEIA and the biweekly party journal ERA SOCIALISTA denouncing alleged proposals by unnamed--presumably Soviet--advocates of such schemes as "international production complexes" on the ground they would infringe on the national economic structures of the CEMA countries.

ENERGY Implications that there are still unresolved problems of fuel and power supply among the CEMA countries were evident in the restrained treatment of this issue in the final communique on the Budapest meeting. Aside from praise for construction of the gas pipeline between Orenburg and the western Soviet border, the communique reported only that the CEMA member countries had "paid particular attention" to energy problems and that their fuel and power economy had been developing according to plan and "on the whole, in a balanced manner." The session reportedly assigned to the CEMA Commission for Cooperation and Planning the task of drawing up proposals for setting up a "unified electric power supply system," to be submitted to the next CEMA council session. Such a plan was to include "suitable cooperation with the energy supply system of Yugoslavia," which has been a "participant" in CEMA activities since 1964 and was represented at the Budapest session by a deputy premier. Not mentioned in the final communique, but cited by several speakers, was a decision at the session to draft a long-range program of cooperation in fuel and power through 1990.

The higher Soviet oil prices in 1975 and in the 1976-80 plan period were alluded to only indirectly by Kosygin in his speech on the 24th. Noting the "deepening raw material, energy and currency crises" of the world capitalist economy, he drew on the authority of Brezhnev's statement at the Hungarian party congress last March to note that the world market situation "cannot fail to have a certain influence on our economic affairs" since the socialist countries have "quite broad economic relations with the nonsocialist world." After noting in subdued terms that the CEMA countries have "in the main" solved their energy supply problems for the 1976-80 plan period, Kosygin pointed out that the Soviet Union for its part was taking steps to increase the share of "raw materials" in its national economy to help meet the needs of the other socialist countries. In his windup speech on the 26th Kosygin predicted that the new multilateral integration plan--not directly linked to power-related projects in the final communique--would contribute to solving problems in the power industry as well as in such areas as metallurgy, machine building, and agriculture.

- 23 -

In the Budapest meeting's most candid discussion of the current state of the energy supply problem, Polish Premier Jaroszewicz noted that Poland, like "most" CEMA countries, was not self-sufficient in energy. He added that Warsaw's outlays over many years for geological prospecting for new energy sources had "not brought us the expected results." Endorsing Kosygin's opening speech and the projected CEMA unified power system, Jaroszewicz praised "the fruitful efforts" of the Soviet party and government "to meet the demand of the CEMA countries for oil."

- 24 -

PORTUGAL

USSR CRITICAL OF SOCIALISTS, CAUTIOUS ON TRANSITION PROGRAM

Moscow has continued its generally cautious stance toward developments in Portugal, providing little reportage and virtually no comment on the 21 June communique of the Portuguese Revolutionary Council outlining a "party pluralism" concept for the country's transition to a socialist society. But the contretemps resulting from the mid-May suspension of the Socialist Party (PS) paper REPUBLICA elicited a sudden burst of outspoken criticism of the Socialists and PS leader Mario Soares, deriding Soares' concept of socialism and accusing him of trying to discredit the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). The publication in a Paris paper on 23 June of a REPUBLICA special issue containing alleged "Kremlin directives" to the West European communist parties on ways to seize power evoked indignant reaction from Moscow to this "forgery." But there was little focus on any Socialist Party role in the affair, PRAVDA expressing only "perplexity and regret" that the PS had "proved to be involved." And Moscow on the 28th, rather belatedly and seemingly reluctantly, issued a brief "TASS refutation" of the "fabrications."

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE

Moscow has been reticent regarding the 21 June Revolutionary Council communique outlining Portugal's transition to a socialist society. In one guarded comment, IZVESTIYA political observer Bovin, on the Moscow radio observers' roundtable on 29 June, took a wait-and-see attitude, remarking that "it is difficult to say" how events in Portugal will develop in the immediate future. He noted that after lengthy sessions of the Revolutionary Council and the MFA, the struggle over Portugal's "choice of road" had been solved, with the communique stating "in a clear-cut, distinct manner" that Portugal would develop along the socialist path.

TASS on 21 June, reporting the domestic aspects of the Council communique, had likewise emphasized its commitment to create a socialist society. While noting the communique's recognition of the multiparty nature of the current transitional stage, TASS also reported that the Council had "stressed that the Armed Forces Movement has a supra-party character" and that the MFA appealed to the people to take an active part in the establishment and work of popular organizations "that should form a structure of direct democracy." TASS' 22 June report on the foreign policy aspects of the communique briefly noted that the Council said it would "respect the pacts concluded in the past, in particular, that of its participation in NATO."

- 25 -

CRITICISM OF
SOARES

While Moscow had earlier been playing down confrontations between the Socialist Party (PS) and the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and had avoided replying some of the PCP's more vitriolic attacks on the Socialists, LITERARY GAZETTE and IZVESTIYA, on 11 and 14 June respectively, openly assailed PS leader Soares. The sudden attacks seemed associated with one of the crises in the REPUBLICA affair, when the Socialists were threatening to withdraw from the government coalition unless the dispute which caused the closure of REPUBLICA was settled. LITERARY GAZETTE charged that the target of Soares' "rhetorical salvos" was always the PCP, and that his two-fold plan aimed at discrediting the PCP's political program and then imposing his "own concept of socialism" on the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), "whose 'ideological contours are still poorly defined,' as Soares has arrogantly declared." LITERARY GAZETTE claimed that Soares' recent statements gave an impression that the people's alliance with the MFA, "which provides for the broad participation of political parties" in the reorganization of society, was an obstacle to the development of Portugal, which "should only follow the path offered by Soares." LITERARY GAZETTE concluded by equating Soares' "highly unseemly role" with that of the "most rightwing and dimmest" of Western social democrats "back in the worst times of the cold war."

Three days later, IZVESTIYA's Ardatovskiy provided his version of the reasons for the closure of REPUBLICA, a newspaper which after the April 1974 revolution "did not belong to any party" but expressed the revolution's ideals, until the Socialist Party "began to 'purge' the newspaper" of persons who did not pursue its line. Ardatovskiy claimed that the country had been damaged by the Socialist Party leadership's "ballyhoo" over the paper, and asserted that Soares and other PS leaders had isolated themselves from the country's genuine problems. The Western press, he noted, was lauding the PS for its efforts to attack the Communist Party, the "leading detachment of the working people."

An international review in the 17 June TRUD also took a swipe at the Socialists' refusal to participate in ministerial council sessions after the "government's legitimate decision" on the suspension of REPUBLICA. TRUD cited the Lisbon SECULO for the view that the Socialists were to blame for the difficult situation, and went on in Moscow's more customary vein to urge strengthening of democratic forces, unity, and making efforts to "avert a split" and to strengthen the union of the popular masses and the MFA.

On the 18th TASS reported a PCP statement issued the previous day on the situation in the country, noting that the PCP urged the parties to subordinate their differences to the supreme interests of the

- 26 -

country, and quoting the statement as calling it "absolutely imperative to draw a distinction between the parties that march together with the revolution process" and those that oppose the development of this process. PRAVDA's international review on the 22d, citing the PCP statement, singled out the passage on subordination of differences and also quoted the statement as saying that building democracy and socialism in Portugal was "impossible without the PCP's participation, let alone in opposition to the PCP." Although PCP leader Alvaro Cunhal had used almost these exact words on PCP participation in an 18 May warning to the AFM, Moscow at that time had not picked up the phrase.

- 27 -

NOTES

MOSCOW ON "INSTRUCTIONS" TO WESTERN CP'S: Moscow has advanced beyond its earlier disowning of alleged "Kremlin instructions" to West European CP's on seizing power, as published in the 23 June LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, with a Davydov commentary broadcast by Moscow radio in several European languages on the 26th treating that "crude deceit" in the wider context of obstruction of preparations for the projected all-European communist party conference. PRAVDA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on the 25th and two TASS items on the 26th had dealt primarily with French CP and Portuguese CP denials of the authenticity of the alleged instructions, as reported by the suspended Portuguese Socialist Party paper REPUBLICA in a special issue which appeared as an insert in LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS. On the 28th, Moscow in a "TASS refutation" termed the "so-called Kremlin instructions" as "nothing but a provocative fabrication" intended to slander the West European communist parties' activities and to damage the cause of revolutionary change in Portugal. The Davydov talk, which dealt only briefly with LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS' offense, lumped it together with other purported efforts by "reactionary" circles to obstruct the convening of the planned European CP conference by emphasizing disagreements among the parties during the conference preparations. Pointing to European parties which had heretofore manifested varying degrees of independence, Davydov noted that the French CP's L'HUMANITE had labeled the "Kremlin instructions" as absurd and deceitful and that the Romanian, British and Italian CPs had recently reiterated their support for the planned European CP conference. Prior to the Davydov commentary, Moscow had left it to its East European allies to refute Western conjectures that the European CP conference preparations were encountering difficulties.

CHINESE CP ANNIVERSARY: Peking marked the CCP's 54th anniversary on 1 July in subdued fashion; unlike last year, no PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial was issued to mark the occasion. NCNA on 1 July issued a review of national press treatment of the anniversary, which stated that central press organs had frontpaged a large picture of Mao Tse-tung and carried selected Mao quotations. The review also called attention to an article on the CCP by Yen Chun published on the third page of the PEOPLE'S DAILY. The article, broadcast by Peking on 1 July, failed to specifically mention the party's anniversary in a lengthy but routine call for the party to strengthen its leadership over the current campaign to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat. Provincial radios welcomed party day with a number of routine articles on the party's overall role. Peking's low-keyed treatment of this year's anniversary of the party

- 28 -

is similar to that in 1972 and 1973, following the Lin Piao affair. During the years 1968-71, party anniversaries had been greeted with joint PEOPLE'S DAILY-RED FLAG-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorials.

- 1 -

A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 23 - 29 JUNE 1975

<u>Moscow (2755 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1002 items)</u>		
CEMA Council 29th Session	(--)	9%	Criticism of Moscow Reaction to PRC-Japan Treaty Talks	(4%)	8%
[Kosygin Speeches]	(--)	4%	UN International Women's Year Conference	(1%)	8%
China	(5%)	6%	Mozambique Independence	(--)	7%
Ponomarev in Syria	(2%)	5%	Gabon President Bongo in PRC	(--)	7%
Mozambique Independence	(--)	4%	Korean War 25th Anniversary	(--)	5%
Gromyko in Italy	(--)	4%	Mao Health Directive 10th Anniversary	(--)	5%
Belgian King Baudouin in USSR	(--)	3%	India	(3%)	3%
India	(--)	2%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

Approved for Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160003-1

TCM 75-27

C 1 of 1
TCM 75-27

Trends in Communist Media

9 Jul 75

~~Confidential~~

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

~~Confidential~~

9 JULY 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 27)

This report is based exclusively on foreign media materials and is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.



CONFIDENTIAL

EBIS TRENDS
9 JULY 1975

CONTENTS

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Moscow Criticizes U.S. Talk of Nuclear Arms Use 1

PRC-USSR-U.S.

Peking Sees Brezhnev Taking Hitler's Path, U.S. on Guard. . . . 3

USSR-PRC-JAPAN

Moscow Continues To Caution Japan on PRC Treaty Clause. 5

KOREA

DPRK Notes Anniversary of Declaration on North-South Unity. . . 7

INDOCHINA

Hanoi Media Release Giap-Dung Analysis of Vietnam Victory . . . 9

Saigon Radio Operating Changes Constrict Listening Range. . . . 11

Lao Patriotic Front Central Committee Outlines Policies 12

ROMANIA-CEMA

Belatedly Released Manescu Speech Details Independent Stance. . 14

BALKAN AFFAIRS

Sofia Circumspect on Greek-Proposed Balkan Conference 17

CHINA

Cadres Urged To Restrict Rights Prudently, Maintain Stability . 19

USSR

Crackdown on Armenian Agitation in Azerbaydzhan Revealed. . . . 20

NOTES

Gromyko on Middle East; Trinidad Leader in Moscow, Havana;
Thai CP on PRC-Thai Relations 22

APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics 1

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 1 -

U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW CRITICIZES U.S. TALK OF NUCLEAR ARMS USE

Moscow has criticized as inimical to improved U.S.-Soviet relations the recent statements by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger concerning circumstances in which the United States could be the first to use nuclear weapons in the wake of a conventional attack. In addition to routine original comment, Moscow has publicized critical statements by members of Congress. At the same time the media have played down the notion that Schlesinger's statements signify any change in U.S. policy. Moscow has remained silent in recent years on its own policy toward the first use of nuclear weapons, in contrast to the Khrushchev era in the early 1960's when official Soviet statements unilaterally renounced first use. Since the late 1960's, Moscow has sought U.S. agreement to bilateral and multilateral pacts that would prohibit all use of nuclear weapons.

Soviet media reported President Ford's 25 June press conference remarks on retention of "maximum flexibility" in nuclear weapons employment only in reporting the White House clarification two days later that this represented no change in U.S. policy. Moscow refrained from direct criticism of the U.S. first use debate until subsequent elaborations by Secretary Schlesinger provided a clearer and more convenient peg. As reported by the Western press, the thrust of the Secretary's remarks was to bolster the deterrent value of the U.S. nuclear arsenal by ruling out U.S. adoption of a posture of no first use of nuclear weapons against the USSR or other adversary since that would restrict the ability of the United States to respond to a massive attack by conventional means that threatened vital U.S. interests. Soviet accounts have conveyed few of the subtleties in the Secretary's clarifications, being generally content to report that he refused to rule out a possible "nuclear first strike" against the USSR.

Subsequently, the media have publicized criticism of his remarks and of official discussion of first use in general by several members of Congress, including Senator Cranston and Representative Ottinger, and by Democratic presidential aspirants Fred Harris and Terry Sanford. Soviet media were slow to provide original comment on the matter. A broadcast to North America on 4 July wondered "how is it possible to negotiate limitations on strategic arms and at the same time publicly discuss plans for a first nuclear strike?" On 8 July TASS summarized an IZVESTIYA article which said such U.S. "plans" for possible first use are contrary to the spirit of U.S.-Soviet efforts toward improved relations.

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.

- 2 -

On the other hand, a broadcast to North America on the 8th agreed with Schlesinger that he is offering "nothing new" in U.S. policy, noted antecedents for a "first strike" policy in the massive retaliation theory ascendant in the 1950's, and found the major difference now to be greater public opposition to such a policy.

EARLIER U.S. STATEMENTS The Soviets reacted more authoritatively as well as more harshly to similar U.S. statements in the early 1960's, and it seems unlikely that they see any substantive change in U.S. policy in these recent statements. Rather, as with Secretary Schlesinger's discussion of retargeting U.S. nuclear weapons last year, they seem more concerned about the implications for Washington's attitude toward the further development of U.S.-Soviet relations raised by public discussion of such matters. In 1962 and 1963, Khrushchev, Minister of Defense Malinovskiy, Marshal Grechko and others criticized President Kennedy personally for statements which allegedly expressed a U.S. policy providing for possible employment of nuclear weapons first against the USSR. In a June 1962 speech, Khrushchev quoted Kennedy as declaring that "in certain circumstances the United States might take the initiative and start a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union." Soviet spokesmen at the time interpreted alleged statements to this effect by the former President and Secretary of Defense McNamara as designed to condition the U.S. public for the possibility of war.

SOVIET POLICY ON FIRST USE Proposals for a general prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons have been a staple of the post-war Soviet position on arms control. For a period in the early 1960's, official Soviet statements went further to unilaterally renounce any intention of being the first to use nuclear weapons against another country. This was accompanied by a Soviet bloc proposal that all nuclear powers should renounce first use of nuclear weapons as a step to an agreement banning their use altogether. Disavowals of Soviet first use disappeared after Khrushchev's fall in October 1964, though as late as the 23d CPSU Congress in the spring of 1966 Brezhnev restated Soviet interest in a joint agreement by nuclear powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In recent years, Moscow has eschewed direct statements of its own policy on first use. Soviet statements have instead reiterated their long-standing support for a general prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons while on occasion criticizing as less far-reaching than their own the current PRC proposal that nuclear powers renounce first use of such weapons.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 JULY 1975

- 3 -

PRC - USSR - U. S.

PEKING SEES BREZHNEV TAKING HITLER'S PATH, U.S. ON GUARD

Peking has sharpened its continuing polemic against Soviet detente policy in Europe with a lengthy 1 July NCNA correspondent's commentary which charged that Brezhnev is pursuing Hitler's strategy to dominate Europe and ultimately the world. The commentary sees Moscow's main current objective as being to gain control of Europe by pushing out the United States and weakening Western defense through a strategy of using public calls for detente and relaxed tensions to obscure Soviet militarization and expansion. The commentary's approval for what it called "desperate" U.S. efforts to resist Moscow's strategy, comes in the wake of NCNA pickups of recent pronouncements by Secretary Schlesinger on U.S. determination to support NATO's defense and to strengthen U.S. nuclear and conventional war capabilities against the USSR in Europe.

Peking's equating of Brezhnev's policies with those of Hitler is rare but not unique; the last such authoritative characterization appeared in a 9 May 1975 PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial commemorating the 30th anniversary of the victory over Germany.* The harsher anti-Soviet invective in the current article employed Mao quotations--not known to have been previously publicized in PRC media--which link Brezhnev to Hitler and castigate the USSR as a "paper tiger" divorced from the people. Mao is said to have stated that

"All the reputedly powerful reactionaries were merely paper tigers. The reason was that they were divorced from the people. Was not Hitler a paper tiger? Was Hitler not overthrown?" "Revisionist Soviet Union is a paper tiger too."

The NCNA article served to underscore Peking's concern over the expected impetus to detente in Europe of the upcoming European Security Summit Conference.

BREZHNEV POLICIES Comparing Brezhnev's present strategy in Europe with Hitler's "sanguinary fascist dictatorship" and "armed aggression," NCNA said the current Soviet public stress on detente and disarmament is identical to

* The editorial is discussed in the TRENDS of 14 May 1975, pages 15-16.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

Hitler's repeated calls for peace prior to his initiation of World War II. Peking claimed that Brezhnev's current military plan of "making a feint in the East but attacking the West" duplicated Hitler's initial move against Czechoslovakia prior to his all-out assault to the West against France and Britain, noting that both aggressors coveted West European resources and economic strength as a basis for world power. Peking alleged that Moscow used the same rationale for expansion as did Hitler, noting that the Soviet justification for occupying Czechoslovakia in 1968 recalled Hitler's rationale in occupying Norway at the start of World War II. The article also contained a lengthy discussion of Brezhnev's alleged mimicking of Hitler's example in militarizing the Soviet economy, expanding armaments for aggression, and poisoning the minds of the Soviet people with chauvinistic doctrines.

U.S. VIGILANCE In contrast to its anti-Soviet diatribe, the NCNA commentary briefly treated the United States in a straightforward manner as a declining superpower making understandable defensive efforts to shore up its interests against the USSR, especially in Europe. At the same time NCNA reports of 28 June and 5 July have focused favorable attention on recent pronouncements by Defense Secretary Schlesinger as prime examples of prudent U.S. vigilance and defensive strategy against Soviet expansionism. The Schlesinger statements included an article in the latest edition of the NATO REVIEW and his 1 July interview with newsmen in Washington. NCNA highlighted the Secretary's stress on the need for enhanced U.S. nuclear and conventional war capability in Europe in the face of the Warsaw Pact buildup, citing for instance Schlesinger's 1 July disclosure that the United States had assigned a certain number of its Poseidon submarines to Europe to strengthen NATO's nuclear striking force. Peking noted approvingly Schlesinger's speculation on the 1st that the United States might reduce its Marine Corps presence in the Asia-Pacific region in order to shift some marines to the European theater to enhance allied strength against suspected Soviet advances.

NCNA also noted Schlesinger's 1 July refusal to disavow U.S. first use of nuclear weapons, but portrayed this as an understandable U.S. position to protect Western defenses in the face of the Soviet threat to Europe. The PRC has not directly criticized Secretary Schlesinger's 20 June press conference discussion of possible U.S. use of nuclear weapons in Korea, though it did replay North Korean criticism. Peking has also remained silent on President Ford's 25 June press conference in which he refused to rule out U.S. use of nuclear weapons in Korea.

Classified by 000073
 Automatically declassified
 six months from date of issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 JULY 1973

- 5 -

U S S R - P R C - J A P A N

MOSCOW CONTINUES TO CAUTION JAPAN ON PRC TREATY CLAUSE

Since 18 June when Moscow released its first official comment on the proposed Sino-Japanese treaty, Soviet media have continued to caution Japan against China's demand that an "anti-hegemony" clause be included in the treaty. Soviet media have been somewhat ambiguous as to the exact nature of the Soviet statement, which TASS on the 18th and subsequent Soviet comment have referred to as a "statement to the government of Japan." However, a 3 July article in the Soviet newspaper SOCIALIST INDUSTRY, attributed to G. Emin, seemed to confirm Japanese reports that the statement was in fact the "note" handed to the Japanese ambassador on 12 June by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko: The article referred to the "12 June statement to the Japanese government transmitted by TASS." THE SOCIALIST INDUSTRY article also stated that the Japanese had responded to the Soviet demarche in a statement handed to Gromyko on 19 June.*

The author of the 3 July article seemed optimistic about Japan's stand on the treaty issue. He noted that in its reply to the Soviets, Japan observed that the development of good relations with the USSR was a consistent Japanese government policy and that the talks with the PRC were not directed against third countries. The author recalled that the Soviet statement had expressed the hope that the Japanese government would not do anything to harm relations between the USSR and Japan when developing its relations with third countries and said that Japan's reply indicated "by all appearances this is not at variance with the opinion of the Japanese leaders."

Soviet comment has played up Japanese opposition to bowing to Chinese demands, pointing out that the issue is not simply a party dispute and have avoided direct criticism of the Miki government. Moscow's harshest rebukes have been aimed at Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) Chairman Narita, who virtually accepted the Chinese positions while visiting the PRC in May. An article by S. Losev in the 26 June ZA RUBEZHOM for the first time reported that the JSP Central

* TASS had carried brief items reporting that Gromyko met with the Japanese ambassador on 12 and 19 June but gave no clue as to the nature of the meeting. The Soviet statement, called a "government statement" in a 2 July Moscow Radio Peace and Progress broadcast, is not known to have been carried in the Soviet press. The statement is discussed in the TRENDS of 18 June, page 11, and of 25 June, page 22.

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

9 JULY 1975

- 6 -

Executive Committee plenum on 9-10 June had endorsed Narita's position, but expressed confidence that the JSP congress in December "will rescind the capitulationist decision."

Most of the recent Soviet comment on the hegemony clause has claimed that the provisions desired by the Chinese would result in a virtual Sino-Japanese military alliance against the USSR. Losev, for example, stated that Peking was insisting that the treaty "include an article committing Japan and China to act jointly 'against the desire by one or more superpowers to establish hegemony'" and that there be a system of consultations to examine what constitutes a desire for hegemony. According to Losev, the "Tokyo press" views such a system as in "the nature of a military alliance," and official Japanese representatives have opposed it.

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

K O R E A

DPRK NOTES ANNIVERSARY OF DECLARATION ON NORTH-SOUTH UNITY

North Korean comment on the third anniversary of the 4 July 1972 North-South declaration on reunification was less extensive, at a lower level, and employed somewhat less invective than last year. Comment this year included a 3 July statement by Kim Yong-chu, the North's cochairman of the North-South coordination committee, a 5 July NODONG SINMUN editorial supporting the statement, and a KCNA commentary. Last year's commemoration, which had marked a harsher turn for DPRK rhetoric, also included a Pyongyang rally attended by several Political Committee members and a NODONG SINMUN editorial article that employed notably harsh language toward ROK President Pak, calling him a "rank traitor" and "a wretch."

Cochairman Kim, who said last year that North-South relations had "returned" to their status before the declaration, warned this year that the dialog was "on the verge of rupture" and that relations were "in a dangerous state." He blamed the breakdown on the ROK, on U.S. "imperialists" who "hold all actual power," and on "Japanese monopoly capital." Kim emphasized that in the face of U.S. and ROK "military provocations," which are resulting in the danger of war "mounting daily," the DPRK continues to push for peaceful unification of the country.

Kim avoided invective in referring to the South Korean "authorities" or "rulers" and setting conditions which they must fulfill to achieve reunification. Echoing a line sounded last fall, Kim called on the South's leaders to resign if they could not fulfill the conditions, to make room for a "patriotic and democratic figure." Unlike DPRK Foreign Minister Ho Tam last fall, Kim did not imply that negotiations with the incumbent authorities could go no further, leaving open the possibility that they could "alter their stance"; nor did he call for the "overthrow" of the ROK government, as had a slogan adopted at the 10th Korean Workers Party plenum in February. In setting conditions for the ROK, Kim stressed that "repression" in the South must end and that the South must insist on the "immediate" withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. Most high-level DPRK initiatives in recent years have not specified a time frame for U.S. withdrawal. Kim also reiterated the standard DPRK proposal for convening a "great national congress" attended by people of all strata from both sides to promote reunification.

- 8 -

The 5 July NODONG SINMUN editorial was generally restrained in its references to the ROK government, though it did make one reference to the "Pak Chong-hui clique." Lower-level comment, however, was less restrained. A 4 July KCNA commentary referred to the "Pak Chong-hui puppet clique," the "group of flunkeyist traitors," and "reactionaries." The commentary also spoke of the need for "overthrowing" the Pak government before reunification can be realized. A 6 July NODONG SINMUN commentary, responding to President Pak's 4 July statement criticizing Northern moves to block reunification, was also harsh in its criticism, calling Pak a "traitor." The commentary stated that the North-South dialog has "deadlocked" and a permanent split is "hanging more heavily over our land." The commentary warned that if the ROK continued its "wartime system" of repression it would "meet a miserable end in the raging flames of revolution." Without indicating a chance for reform from within, the commentator stated that the Pak government must "step down from 'power' as unanimously demanded by the South Korean people."

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.

- 9 -

INDOCHINA

HANOI MEDIA RELEASE GIAP-DUNG ANALYSIS OF VIETNAM VICTORY

Hanoi radio on 30 June released the first major, authoritative analysis of the offensive which culminated in the communist victory in South Vietnam. The article--entitled "Great Victory of the Spring 1975 Offensive and Uprising"--was coauthored by DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and Chief of the General Staff Van Tien Dung. Dubbed "important" by Hanoi radio, the article has been given the wide dissemination which would be expected of such a pronouncement--it was broadcast in two 75-minute installments on 30 June and 2 July, and published in the party newspaper NHAN DAN, the party theoretical journal HOC TAP, the military newspaper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, and the military journal TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.

According to Hanoi radio, the lengthy article was written to mark the "great victory" and the 85th anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth--events which were formally celebrated on 15 and 19 May, respectively. The month and a half delay in releasing the article is somewhat puzzling. While there may have been some disagreement among the DRV leadership as to a proper public assessment of the victory, the attribution of the article to Hanoi's two foremost military leaders gives a veneer of collectivity and authoritativeness to the article.

Giap and Dung are not known to have ever coauthored an article before, either with each other or any one else. While they have authored a number of authoritative discussions of military affairs--Giap in particular has in the past been quite prolific and is renowned for his theoretical treatment of military strategy and tactics--neither is known to have written post-mortems of the 1968 or 1972 general offensives mounted by the communists in the South. Public evaluation of the earlier offensives was mainly handled by Hanoi's prominent pseudonymous commentators "Chien Thang" (Victor) and "Chien Binh" (Combatant). While Chien Binh has not been heard from since December 1973, the Chien Thang byline was used in a highly boastful and self-congratulatory comment on the final offensive that appeared in the 2 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.*

* For a discussion of the Chien Thang article, see the TRENDS of 7 May 1975, pages 3-5.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160003-1

- 10 -

Clearly intended as a definitive commentary on the conduct of the last days of the war, the Giap-Dung article traces the "historical background" leading up to the battle of Ban Me Thuot--which opened the March Central Highlands campaign, the capture of the Central Highlands, the taking of Hue and Danang, and the fall of Saigon. The article then analyzes the "causes of victory and the new development of the art of leading revolutionary war"--an account that attributes the lion's share of the credit for the communist victory to the party and notes that the "northern people and combatants . . . stood shoulder to shoulder with the southern people and combatants, simultaneously performing combat and construction."*

* The substance of the Giap-Dung article will be discussed in a forthcoming issue of the TRENDS.

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160003-1

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 JULY 1975

- 11 -

SAIGON RADIO OPERATING CHANGES CONSTRICT LISTENING RANGE

Technical changes in Saigon radio's operations in late June eliminated its shortwave broadcasts audible over a wide area of Vietnam and abroad and left operating only mediumwave or the common "broadcast band" transmitters clearly audible only in the Saigon area. The elimination of Saigon's shortwave broadcasting, while Hanoi and Liberation radios continue their own shortwave broadcasts, has the effect of sharply curtailing access outside the Saigon area to radio news about Saigon events, as well as making the Hanoi and Liberation Radio broadcasts the only Vietnamese internal radios easily heard throughout South Vietnam.

The change in broadcasting patterns became evident on 20 June, when a new Saigon radio schedule listed only mediumwave frequencies and omitted previously used shortwave frequencies that can be heard at long distances. From 23 June, when the new Saigon schedule went into effect, Saigon radio broadcasts for general audiences have been inaudible outside of Vietnam and presumably have only limited reception outside the Saigon area. At the same time, Hanoi and Liberation radio broadcasts, also carried on shortwave, are being relayed through the facilities of the Saigon station on high-powered mediumwave transmitters that will insure improved reception of these programs throughout South Vietnam, and especially in the Saigon area.

On the same day that Saigon radio stopped using shortwave for its regular programming, LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA), which had begun transmitting its radioteletype English service from Saigon on the 16th, without advance notice also suspended its scheduled transmissions. However, LPA came back on the air on the 26th without explanation, transmitting an unusual number of items apparently intended to make up for the three-day hiatus.*

* See the TRENDS of 25 June 1975, page 1, for a discussion of Saigon radio behavior and LPA's apparent cessation of operation on 23 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

9 JULY 1975

- 12 -

LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT CENTRAL COMMITTEE OUTLINES POLICIES

A 27 June statement from the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) Central Committee on the "new situation" in Laos has provided the most authoritative and extensive discussion to date of LPF policies following the virtual collapse in mid-May of rightwing opposition forces in the coalition government. The statement, disseminated repeatedly by Pathet Lao media beginning on 27 June, reviewed Pathet Lao positions on domestic and foreign issues, including the "uprisings" in many parts of the country and relations with the United States and other countries.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE The Central Committee statement was
STATEMENT HIGHLIGHTS restrained in tone and content, reflecting the Pathet Lao's general satisfaction with recent developments while hinting of slight apprehension that the exiled rightists might attempt to regain their former influence. In general the statement was conciliatory toward former enemies and free from any suggestion of bitterness or of a desire to take revenge, even including an endorsement of amnesty for those who had been "misled" and were "making up for their misdeeds."

Discussing the Laotian internal situation, the document repeated the standard Pathet Lao explanation for the recent "uprisings," asserting that the people "had no other choice but to rise up" and oppose injustices allegedly perpetuated by the rightists. It endorsed as "just and correct" the struggle to "destroy the unjust and decadent system and replace it with a new system." Labeling the rightwing leaders who fled the country in mid-May as the "most dangerous, primary enemy of our nation" the statement appealed to remaining rightist members of the government to "understand their due responsibility to history" by opposing any attempt by the exiled politicians to "carry out their tricks, and from shielding their crimes."

On international affairs, the Pathet Lao leadership implied it would not implement a xenophobic policy, as the Cambodian leadership had done since its April military victory, by noting that it "advised" the PGNU to establish relations with "every" country, particularly "neighboring" countries. The statement endorsed the view that the PGNU "should maintain relations with the U.S. government," reiterated the standard demand that the U.S. government "completely and immediately cease all kinds of intervention and involvement in the internal affairs of Laos," and called upon the United States to make "earnest contributions to heal the wounds of war" in Laos.

Classified by 000073
 Automatically declassified
 six months from date of issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 13 -

The Pathet Lao document also expressed a willingness to repair relations with Bangkok and to "forget the past," and it proposed that the PGNU "maintain friendly relations with the Thai government, as with any other neighboring country." This expressed willingness to start anew with the Thai government represented a departure from previous Pathet Lao radio commentaries, which had been bitterly critical of Thailand. The LPF Central Committee statement asked in return that the Thai government cease its involvement in Laos' internal affairs, not allow the U.S. to use its Thai bases to "threaten" Laos, and not permit the Lao "reactionaries" to use Thailand as a "springboard" to oppose the Lao people.

LEADERS' APPEARANCES Pathet Lao media have not specifically acknowledged the holding of a Central Committee meeting; however, it seems likely that one was held the first week in June, when most of the key figures in the LPF hierarchy were in Viengsay. LPF Secretary General Vongvichit arrived on 8 June; he had been preceded on 5 June by agitprop specialist Sanan Southichak. LPF Chairman Souphanouvong had been in Viengsay since 17 April. The list of those present for Souphanouvong's 27 June departure for Vientiane confirmed that other top officials were also in Viengsay, including LPF Central Committee vice chairmen Kayson Phomvihan and Sithon Kommadam, and Standing Committee members Nouhak Phoumsavan, Phoun Sipraseut, and Nhiavu Lobliayao.

Several second-echelon LPF officials are also known to have subsequently scheduled visits to Viengsay, possibly to be briefed on the Central Committee's policy decisions and timetable for future action in the coalition government. A 5 July Radio Pathet Lao broadcast reported that NPCC Vice President and Secretary General Khamsouk Keola and several NPCC members had departed for Viengsay on 3 July and would stay "for a period of time on some business." PGNU Economy and Planning Minister Sot Phetrasi, at the 2 July weekly Cabinet meeting in Vientiane, was ostensibly granted leave from his post "for rest in Muong Viengsay."

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 14 -

ROMANIA - CEMA

BELATEDLY RELEASED MANESCU SPEECH DETAILS INDEPENDENT STANCE

Bucharest waited for 10 days to release Premier Manescu's speech at the 24-26 June CEMA Council session in Budapest in which he spelled out in unprecedented detail Romania's determination to pursue an independent course while enjoying the benefits of CEMA membership. The released text of Manescu's speech reveals that he asked for help from Moscow in the form of increased deliveries of energy and technological equipment in order to bring Romania's economic development level up to that of the more industrialized CEMA members. The Romanian premier also announced in his speech that he was submitting three documents to the session: one on raising Romania's industrial development level to equality with the other CEMA states; a second calling on CEMA to join in a worldwide campaign against economic underdevelopment; and a third demanding greater freedom of action for the CEMA member states in contacts with the European Common Market.

The delayed release by AGERPRES and SCINTEIA on 6 July of Manescu's controversial speech contrasts with the prompt publicity by both Bucharest and Bulgarian media for his speech at last year's 25th anniversary CEMA Council meeting on 18-21 June in Sofia. On that occasion Manescu's address, as well as an anniversary message from Ceausescu, had merely reasserted in general terms Romania's policy of basing its cooperation with CEMA on independence and sovereignty.

In his Budapest speech, Manescu went beyond Romanian presentations at previous CEMA sessions in his implied assertion that the burden was on the Soviet Union and the other CEMA members to live up to the CEMA statute by equalizing the economic development levels of all the member countries through, among other things, helping to raise the technological level of Romanian industry. Thus, Manescu bluntly registered his country's dissatisfaction with the results of coordinating national economic plans for 1976-80, one feature of which is a new mechanism allowing annual increases in the price of Soviet oil sold to its CEMA partners. Manescu declared that in the plan coordination process, "mutually acceptable solutions were not worked out" and that energy and raw materials were "outstanding" issues in this connection. He went on to record the Romanians' desire for negotiations with the other CEMA members "immediately" after the Budapest session to secure "additional" deliveries of energy supplies, as well as technological equipment, machine tools, and other products of high technical standard. In this connection the Romanian premier made only

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

9 JULY 1975

- 15 -

passing mention of the multilateral integration plan, introduced with some fanfare at the session, stressing only that this plan should promote the role of cooperation in energy resources and technological equipment in the member countries' individual 1976-80 economic plans.

Asserting that the industrially less-developed socialist countries should have access to "the most advanced technologies," Manescu complained that Bucharest's trade with the other CEMA members, primarily the USSR, "reflected only a part not only of the needs but also of the increased potential of the Romanian economy." At the same time he reiterated Bucharest's opposition to any internationalization of the industrial production process, insisting that there must be high-efficiency industrial complexes "in every country" structured to produce the finished product. Generalized proposals for "international production complexes," featuring completion of different stages of the finished product in different countries, had been scored in Romanian media in the weeks preceding the Budapest session.

Manescu submitted to the Budapest CEMA session a document entitled "Romania's Proposals on the Elaboration of the Program of Measures for Gradual Equalization of the Economic Development Levels of the CEMA Member Countries." Without spelling out the proposals, he invoked the authority of Ceausescu in stressing that equalization was in keeping with the CEMA statute, called for completion of the equalization process during the next 15-20 years, and urged that Bucharest's set of proposals be presented for adoption at the next CEMA Council session.

In a further gesture of Bucharest's self-assertiveness, Manescu tabled a document with the title, "Considerations of Romania on the Promotion and Establishment of a New World Economic Order." The proposal would diffuse rather than concentrate CEMA's resources by committing CEMA member-countries to promote the liquidation of economic underdevelopment on a world scale. In characteristic terms, Manescu added that such a program would ensure to every country "sovereign economic and social development" and promote "equitable interstate relations."

Finally, Manescu submitted to the session a document entitled "Romania's Proposals on Contacts Between CEMA and the Common Market." While Moscow and its East European allies have commented on and taken public steps in the area of CEMA-EC contacts, this issue has been studiously avoided in the communiques on CEMA sessions, including the one on the Budapest Council session. Running counter to Moscow's drive to secure recognition by the EC of CEMA's status as an organization, Manescu declared

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
51 months from date of issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 16 -

that, in addition to EC-CEMA organizational contacts, the CEMA member states "should directly entertain official contacts," conduct negotiations, and conclude agreements with Common Market bodies. Romania, he added, would conduct negotiations on its own with EC member-countries to secure eliminatio.. of discriminatory trade provisions and to settle juridical questions in the area of bilateral trade.

- 17 -

BALKAN AFFAIRS

SOFIA CIRCUMSPECT ON GREEK-PROPOSED BALKAN CONFERENCE

Bulgaria has reacted more cautiously than either Romania or Yugoslavia to proposals by Greek Premier Karamanlis to promote closer Balkan multilateral ties, including the holding of an inter-governmental meeting of the Balkan states. Karamanlis has not publicly discussed his ideas for such a conference but the subject has appeared in the communiques on his recent visits to all three countries.

The communique on Karamanlis' 2-4 July Sofia visit reflected Bulgaria's circumspect attitude toward a Balkan meeting in stating only that a conference "at the expert or ministerial level" could be "useful," whereas the communiques following his earlier Bucharest and Belgrade visits had affirmed a "readiness" on the part of the signatories to participate in a meeting of the Balkan states. The Sofia communique further indicated the extent to which Bulgaria had qualified its support in noting that the meeting should be held only "after agreement is reached by all Balkan countries," an apparent Bulgarian allusion to likely difficulties involving Turkish and Albanian participation in any Balkan conference.

On several occasions during Karamanlis' visit, Bulgarian party chief Zhivkov expressed his own personal reservations about multilateral Balkan ties. In an interview published in the 2 July Athens daily TO VIMA, for example, he cautioned against rushing into new forms of regional cooperation and contended that the development of bilateral relations was the "safest way to consolidate confidence among individual Balkan countries and therefore to create an atmosphere of common confidence in the whole region."

Both Romania and Yugoslavia reacted more positively to Karamanlis' proposals during his visits on 26-27 May and 4-5 June, respectively. In addition to words of praise for existing routine forms of Balkan regional cooperation, Bucharest and Belgrade, according to the communiques, agreed to Athens' call for "new forms" of multilateral cooperation in the economic and scientific-technical fields. The Bucharest communique also pointed out that such cooperation "could gradually lead to closer political cooperation" among the Balkan countries. Further indicating Bucharest's accord with Athens, party chief Ceausescu, at a dinner for Karamanlis on 27 May, asserted that the Balkan states could avoid a recurrence of their

Classified by 000073
 Automatically declassified
 six months from date of issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

9 JULY 1975

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160003-1
- 18 -

stormy past, prompted by the efforts of the big powers to promote "hate-mongering" among Balkan countries, "only by developing good neighborly relations and multilateral cooperation"

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160003-1

CHINA

CADRES URGED TO RESTRICT RIGHTS PRUDENTLY, MAINTAIN STABILITY

An article in the July RED FLAG by Pai Shan, carried by NCNA on 2 July, indicated once again that Peking continues to be concerned about curbing overzealous cadres who exceed the party's carefully measured pace for restricting "bourgeois rights"--such as narrowing wage differences and restricting agricultural private plots--and thus endanger economic goals. Pai pointed out that "not only do we have to . . . eliminate the 'birthmarks of the old society' step by step," but "we must also make vigorous efforts to develop the national economy and bring about all-round modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense as well as science and technology." He stressed that strong party leadership was necessary "to achieve all this" and he focused on the "responsibility" of party organizations to "maintain the party's discipline" and play the leading role in guiding the masses to fulfill the party's goals. The article called upon all party members to oppose the "erroneous tendencies of doing something different within the party and acting independently of the party."

Peking has grappled with the problem of overzealous cadres since last March, when authoritative articles instructed party officials to avoid hasty actions--implicitly those which might seek to impose restraints on material production incentives too quickly and thereby threaten political order and China's ambitious economic plans. The unusual frankness of two recent broadcasts from Harbin may indicate that a more intense drive is underway to prevent local cadres from overstepping party directives on the campaign. Harbin radio on 25 June reported that a recent provincial meeting on studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat had cautioned cadres that the party's policy "must not be changed at will or applied as a matter of expediency to suit one's own need." It specifically declared that "private plots and family sideline production in compliance with policy should not be cancelled without good reason." And a 27 June Harbin broadcast of a HEILUNGKIANG DAILY editorial argued that "in putting the necessary restrictions on bourgeois rights at present, we should not allow the restrictions to exceed the limits set by the party's present policies." Drawing out the lesson to be learned, the editorial concluded that "neither over-restriction nor under-restriction helps the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

U S S R

CRACKDOWN ON ARMENIAN AGITATION IN AZERBAIDZHAN REVEALED

A recent plenum of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast Party Committee has revealed that virtually the entire leadership of this Azerbaydzhani oblast has been ousted for encouraging Armenian nationalism and supporting a movement to detach the oblast from Azerbaydzhani and join it to Armenia. While the oblast has been part of the Azerbaydzhani SSR since 1923, it lies close to the border of the Armenian SSR, its population is over 80 percent Armenian and its leaders have been almost exclusively Armenians. The campaign against the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh dates back to 1972-73, the same period when a massive purge of Armenian republic leaders and a crackdown on nationalism began in the Armenian SSR.

Speakers at the obkom plenum, which was reported in the 1 April Azerbaydzhani republic paper BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, assailed Armenian writers, journalists and cultural figures for stirring up "national prejudices" which admittedly found support among part of the intelligentsia. The account noted that "some ideologically immature" persons had asked whether the oblast should be part of Azerbaydzhani, and it implied that Armenians were using economic statistics to claim the oblast was being discriminated against by Azerbaydzhani authorities. The former chief of the oblast statistical administration, Zakharyan (an Armenian), was condemned for having compiled statistics "from deeply mistaken positions."

The newspaper account argued that the oblast had flourished as part of Azerbaydzhani, which was "the best proof of how wisely the party of Lenin had resolved the question of Nagorno-Karabakh." The account cited "striking figures" on the oblast's industrial growth, investments, and supply of goods and public services and asserted that the oblast's per capita share of these was higher than that of Azerbaydzhani as a whole. Further, it noted that speakers at the plenum cited the great aid rendered to the oblast by the May 1973 Azerbaydzhani Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree "On Measures to Further Develop the Economy of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaydzhani SSR." The speakers declared that the "nationalistic manifestations" and errors were facilitated by the obkom bureau's longtime "unprincipled position" and were especially the fault of former obkom first secretary G.A. Melkumyan and former ideology secretary A.N. Arutyunyan (both Armenians).

Although the account is vague on dates, it is clear that the Azerbaydzhani crackdown had already begun by January 1973, when ideology secretary Arutyunyan was ousted. The May 1973 Azerbaydzhani decree providing economic assistance was obviously a response to Armenian claims of neglect. These events were followed by the removal of Melkumyan as first secretary in October 1973 and of oblast executive committee chairman M.G. Ogandzhanyan, apparently about the same time. Melkumyan had become first secretary in September 1962, when his predecessor N.G. Shakhnazarov, an Armenian with an Azerbaydzhani name, came under attack by Azerbaydzhani republic officials and was demoted to a minor post in Baku. The new first secretary, B.S. Kevorkov, and new ideology secretary, M.A. Gasparyan, both appear to be Armenians, although the new executive committee chairman, Armans Amirovich Aslanov, appears to be Azerbaydzhani.

The timing of the purge of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh appears to correspond roughly to the beginning of a thorough purge in the Armenian SSR. In November 1972 a CPSU Central Committee official supervised the removal of the Armenian premier and republic Central Committee agriculture secretary, and the longtime Armenian KGB chief was replaced with a Russian. In March 1973 the Armenian republic second secretary (an Armenian) was replaced with a Russian, and in April 1973 republic First Secretary Kochinyan began public attacks on Armenian nationalism. In November 1973 the republic ideology secretary was replaced, and in November 1974 First Secretary Kochinyan himself was finally removed. The last remaining top-level holdover was eliminated recently with the early July 1975 election of B. Ye. Sarkisov (chairman of the Armenian state committee for prices) as Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, replacing 63-year old longtime Chairman N.Kh. Arutyunyan.

NOTES

GROMYKO ON MIDDLE EAST: Soviet media have given none of the substance of Foreign Minister Gromyko's remarks on the Middle East during his 26-29 June official visit to Italy, noting only that the Mideast problem was discussed in talks with Italian leaders and that Gromyko "answered a number of correspondents' questions" on issues including the Middle East at a 29 June Rome press conference. Italian press reports now available have provided details of his remarks, which, while ambiguous, suggest that although Moscow remains opposed "in principle" to the step-by-step approach, it could accent a new Egyptian-Israeli disengagement provided it was linked to the Geneva Mideast conference. According to LA STAMPA on the 29th, Gromyko said at the press conference that "the USSR is in principle resolutely opposed" to the step-by-step approach and that an appropriate forum exists in Geneva for discussing both overall and partial questions. A L'UNITA report on the same press conference agreed that Gromyko had been "distinctly negative" regarding the step-by-step approach but added that he also said that it would be possible to deal with "partial" issues, although this must occur "always and only within the framework of the Geneva conference and with all interested parties present." In another variation, reports in both LA STAMPA and L'UNITA on the 28th stated that Gromyko had said in talks with Italian Premier Moro and Foreign Minister Rumor that the USSR was not, in fact, opposed to the step-by-step approach, provided that "the whole is then referred back to the Geneva conference, which is the only way of comprehensively solving the Mideast question." The communique on Gromyko's visit, carried by TASS, noted "the importance of the speediest resumption" of the Geneva conference, with "suitable preparation" and "on a basis that would insure positive results."

TRINIDAD LEADER IN MOSCOW, HAVANA: Cuban and Soviet coverage of Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Eric Williams' 18-22 June visit to Cuba and 30 June-7 July trip to the Soviet Union emphasized the importance of Caribbean development and unity, including the strengthening of ties between Cuba and the other Caribbean states. Williams' trip to the USSR was the first visit there by a Caribbean Commonwealth head of state; last November he had visited Peking. At a Kremlin luncheon in Williams' honor reported by PRAVDA on 2 July, Kosygin noted that relations between the two countries were "only at the very start of the road" but expressed admiration for nations such as Trinidad which have "liberated themselves from colonial oppression" and offered Soviet assistance in training

- 23 -

skilled cadres of workers for Trinidad. The communique, as reported by TASS on 7 July, noted that the sides had "exchanged opinions" on prospects for cooperation in such fields as sea shipping, fisheries and air services, had agreed to work out "appropriate agreements" in a Port-of-Spain meeting in August and had also reached an "understanding" on holding trade negotiations. In contrast to the formal reception in Moscow, Williams--leader of one of the first Rio Pact countries to establish relations with the Castro government--was warmly received in Havana, Fidel Castro remarking in a 20 June speech on the Cubans' "deep affection and respect" for Williams and their determination to exploit "to the fullest" the opportunities for cooperation. Castro said relations between Cuba and the English-speaking Caribbean islands "have been developing magnificently in recent years," and the final communique reported by Havana domestic service on 24 June reaffirmed Cuba's and Trinidad's commitment to regional cooperation. One obstacle to such cooperation--Trinidad's sensitivity to Venezuelan influence and activity in the Caribbean--apparently was sidestepped by Havana, which has sought good relations with Caracas. Although Williams had earlier indicated that he would take up this matter during the visit, an AFP report of Castro's 21 June news conference noted that when pressed to comment on the issue, Castro said it had not been discussed.

THAI CP ON PRC-THAI RELATIONS: Initial comment by the Thai Communist Party's clandestine radio based in China, Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT), has portrayed Bangkok's establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking as an opportunistic but reluctant response to popular domestic pressure and to a changed international situation. A 4 July article said that "pressure from the people's struggle" was the "main factor" in forcing the "reactionary ruling class" to seek relations with the PRC. It also noted that the failure of the U.S.-led "front to encircle the PRC," demonstrated by former President Nixon's trip to Peking "to ask for contacts," and the defeats suffered by the United States in Indochina had forced Bangkok to change its "hostile policy" toward Peking, lest it find itself more and more isolated internationally. The article warned, however, that "the Khukrit government has not changed its true nature," and that even while he was in Peking to normalize relations Khukrit was stepping up suppression of the people at home under his "internal security policy." The article added that the Thai "reactionary ruling class," "Taiwan capitalists," "U.S. imperialists," and "Soviet social-imperialists" would all attempt to obstruct the relationship between Thailand and the PRC. The Thai CP reaction to the establishment of Thai-PRC relations is consistent with the responses made by other Southeast Asian pro-Peking parties to the normalization of China's relations with non-communist governments in the area during the past four years, i.e., Burma, Malaysia, the Philippines.

- 1 -

A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 30 JUNE - 6 JULY 1975

<u>Moscow (2615 items)</u>		<u>Peking (948 items)</u>	
China	(6%)	7%	Thailand Prime Minister (--) 19%*
U.S. Senate Delegation	(--)	5%	Khukrit in PRC
in USSR			[Joint Communique (--) 4%]
India	(2%)	5%	India (3%) 6%
West German SPD Chair-	(--)	4%	Iraqi Vice President (--) 5%*
man Brandt in USSR			Ma'ruf in PRC
Trinidad and Tobago	(--)	3%	UN International Women's (8%) 4%
Prime Minister			Year Conference
Williams in USSR			Japan (9%) 3%
CEMA Council 29th	(9%)	3%	
Session			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on meetings with Mao Tse-tung.